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held that the officer detected the odor of alcohol

before he inserted his head in the vehicle window.

In addition,

the videotape as well as the officer's testimony shows that Burton
voluntarily admitted that he was drunk.
probable
justified

cause

that

further

Burton

had

investigation

Therefore, the officer had

committed
that

would

confirm the suspicion that had developed.
indicate

that

the

officer's

an

actions

offense,

quickly

which

dispel

or

The facts of the case
were

justifiable

and

reasonable.
Contrary to Burton's argument, the officer had a reasonable
articulable suspicion that Burton was drunk independent of any
alleged

"search"

of

the

vehicle.

Again,

the

trial

judge

specifically held that the officer detected the odor of alcohol
before he inserted his head into the vehicle window.
judge

also

ruled

that

this

gave

the

officer

a

The trial
reasonable

articulable suspicion that Burton was drunk, prior to allegedly
"searching" the vehicle.

Therefore, even if the subsequent "search"

was improper, the officer could have asked Burton to step from the
car and perform field sobriety tests.

In addition, the videotape

of the stop shows that Burton voluntarily admitted he was drunk.
This alone justified the field sobriety tests.
In short, the evidence does not support the judge's conclusion
to suppress the field sobriety tests.

The police officer detected

the odor of alcohol before he inserted his head into the vehicle.
Second, Burton voluntarily admitted he was drunk.

The officer had

a reasonable articulable suspicion that Burton had violated the
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"Rule 11 directs counsel to provide

this court with all
appeal."

evidence

relevant to the issues raised on

Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1002 (Utah App. 1989) .

The transcript of the proceedings and the videotape constitute all
of the evidence relevant to the issue raised in this appeal.

Even

if findings of fact and conclusions of law were formally prepared
and entered, this Court would still review the transcript and
videotape.
Burton's

demand

for

a ruling

established case law in Utah.

in his

favor

violates

the

Failure to prepare an adequate

record of findings is not grounds for winning an appeal.

"It is

well settled that the trial court should make findings on all
material issues tried by the parties, and a failure to do so is
generally considered a reversible error and requires a remand."
Kinkella v. Baugh. 660 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1983) ,l

In other words,

if a trial court fails to prepare findings of fact or conclusions
of law, the appeal should be remanded back so the court could
prepare adequate findings.
Burton cites State v. Genovesi to support his demand for a
ruling in his favor.

However, the trial court's record in

consisted of three brief statements and an order.
other record of the court's findings.

1

Genovesi

There was no

State v. Genovesi, 871 P.2d

See also Parks v. Zions First Nat' 1 Bank, 673 P. 2d 590, 601
(Utah 1983); Anderson v. Utah County Bd. of Comm'rs., 589 P.2d
1214, 1216 (Utah 1979) . It should also be noted that in
Kinkella,
the court concluded that the record was adequate, even though the
trial court had not prepared specific findings. Kinkella,
660 P.2d
at 236.
4

547, 550 (Utah App. 1994) .

The Court of Appeals did not rule on

the case, but remanded the case for rehearing so that the trial
Id.

court could enter more detailed findings of fact.

This

decision was consistent with the established case law, and proper
under the circumstances.
Burton claims that remand would be "difficult and unfair,"
because the trial judge, Carlos Esqueda, is no longer on the bench.
(Brief of Appellee, West
(hereafter

Valley

City

v.

Randy

Burton,

at 10 n.5

"Burton's Brief")).

Burton, however, fails to explain

the difficulty or unfairness.

The transcript of the hearing and

the videotape provide all of the evidence of the hearing, so any
judge

could

ascertain

findings

of

fact

from

the

record.

Furthermore, Mr. Esqueda still practices law in Salt Lake City, and
so is certainly available to prepare findings if so ordered by this
Court.

In short, there is no difficulty or unfairness, because

there is an adequate record of the proceedings and the evidence
available.
To conclude, Burton's demand for a ruling in his favor because
there were no findings prepared is inappropriate and unsupported.
In the first place, there is an adequate record available.

A

transcript of the hearing has been prepared, and the videotape of
Burton's arrest, introduced as evidence, is available.
evidence is available for review.

Thus, all

Second, the proper remedy is

remand so the trial court could prepare findings of fact.

Since

the record is sufficient, any judge could prepare findings, or

5

arrangements

could

be

made

with

Carlos

Esqueda

to

prepare

appropriate findings.
Although contending that the record is sufficient as it is now
constituted, Appellant agrees that findings of fact and conclusions
of law would be beneficial in this case.

Therefore, Appellant has

no objection to remand, provided the remand is limited only to
preparation of findings of fact and conclusions of law based upon
the transcript of the hearing and the videotape of Burton's arrest,
and not a retrial of the facts.
II.

A.

THE OFFICER DID NOT EXCEED THE SCOPE OF HIS
INVESTIGATION,
BECAUSE
HE
HAD
A
REASONABLE
ARTICULABLE SUSPICION THAT BURTON WAS DRUNK, AND
BECAUSE THE OFFICER DILIGENTLY PURSUED MEANS TO
QUICKLY
CONFIRM
THE
EXTENT
OF
BURTON'S
INTOXICATION.

The Officer
Investigation.

did

not

Exceed

the

Legitimate

Scope

of

the

The officer did not exceed the scope of his investigation,
because he had a reasonable articulable suspicion that Burton was
drunk.

The trial judge specifically ruled that the officer had a

reasonable articulable suspicion that Burton was intoxicated, based
on the odor of alcohol from outside of the vehicle.
Hearing on Defendant's Motion to Suppress, West
Randy

Burton

at 32-33

{hereafter

(Transcript of
Valley

"Transcript")).

City

v.

Thus, further

investigation, the trial judge concluded, was justified.

"I've

already ruled that I don't think the officer went beyond the scope
of the detention, because he initially — and it's obvious on the
tape, he initially smells the odor of alcohol . . .
6

So under case

law, under Lopez,

this is a legitimate stop and it does not go

beyond the scope . . . ."

(Id.

at 32). The reasonable articulable

suspicion also justified field sobriety tests, regardless of any
alleged "search" of Burton's vehicle.
Burton argues that the officer did not have a reasonable
articulable suspicion, and thus the officer exceeded the scope of
the original stop.

This however, contradicts the facts and the

judge's specific ruling.

The judge found that the officer detected

the odor of alcohol prior to any alleged "search" of the vehicle.
(Id.
that

at 32-34).

Furthermore, the evidence in the videotape shows

Burton voluntarily

Videotape).

admitted

he was drunk.

(Id.

at 15,

Thus, the officer could articulate specific facts

connecting Burton to criminal activity.2

Since the officer had a

reasonable articulable suspicion that Burton was drunk, the scope
of his investigation expanded so that the officer could confirm the
extent of Burton's intoxication.3

Burton appears obsessed with the fact that the officer
"nodded" to the passenger in the police car, arguing that the nod
indicates that the officer had no cause to investigate further.
The judge dismissed this argument as meaningless. "There's nothing
wrong with a hunch if he can back it up . . . "
(Transcript at 32) ;
see also Whren v. United States, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (1996) (holding
that a legitimate traffic stop does not become illegitimate even
though it was motivated by an officer's "hunch" that a more serious
crime was being committed.) Even if the officer had a "hunch" prior
to approaching Burton, there is ample evidence supporting the
officer's reasonable articulable suspicion that Burton was drunk.
(Transcript at 32-34).
3

Burton's Counsel argues that the Counsel for Appellant
offers no support for the judge's ruling that the officer had a
reasonable articulable suspicion that Burton was drunk. (Burton's
7

Burton reargues the testimony given by the officer to support
his version of the facts.

This is in error, as this Court will not

disturb the factual findings of the trial court unless they are
clearly erroneous.

See State v. Naisbitt, 827 P.2d 969, 971 (Utah

App. 1992) . The trial judge found, as been repeatedly stated, that
the officer detected the odor of alcohol prior to any alleged
search.

(Transcript at 33). Furthermore, the testimony supports

the record of the videotape that Burton voluntarily admitted he was
drunk.
facts

(Id.
that

at 15). Thus, the officer could articulate specific
Burton

investigation.

was

intoxicated,

and

therefore

expand

his

Burton may dislike the judge's findings, but he

cannot argue that the officer exceeded the legitimate scope of the
investigation.
B.

The "Search" of the Vehicle
was Proper,
Because
the
Pursued a Means of Investigation
to Quickly
Confirm the
of Burton's
Intoxication.

Officer
Extent

The officer's investigation was reasonable because it quickly
confirmed that Burton had been drinking heavily, and was a threat
to other drivers.

As was explained in Appellant's Brief, " [i]f

reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity does arise,
the scope of the [traffic] stop is still limited.

The officers

must 'diligently [pursue] a means of investigation that [is] likely
to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly . . . .'"
Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994); see

also

State v.

Appellant's Brief,

Brief at 17 n. 11) . However, even though Burton dislikes the
finding, the judge specifically held that the officer detected the
odor of alcohol prior to any alleged search. (Transcript at 32-34) .
8

West

Valley

City

v.

Randy

Burton

at 8 (other citations omitted).

Recapitulating the relevant facts, the officer had observed
Burton's driving pattern, (Transcript at 26) had detected the odor
of alcohol from outside Burton's vehicle, (Id.

at 32-33) and Burton

had volunteered that he was drunk, (Videotape; see

also

Transcript

at 15) all prior to inserting his head into Burton's vehicle.

At

that point the officer had probable cause that Burton had committed
an offense.

The officer was therefore duty-bound to investigate

the extent of Burton's intoxication, to ensure the public's safety.
The

officer explained

that

he quickly confirmed

drunken state by sniffing the air near Burton.

{Id.

Burton's

at 12). This

confirmation required that the officer place his head near Burton,
which required a slight insertion into the open window of the
vehicle.4

This insertion is justified under Lopez

because it

quickly confirmed that Burton was drunk, without requiring any
effort on Burton's part.

The intrusion was minimal, and Burton was

not required to perform any act.

In addition, the officer gained

no more "evidence" via the intrusion than he already had prior to
the alleged "illegal search."
{Id.

Burton had admitted he was drunk,

at 15; videotape), and the officer had detected the odor of

alcohol prior to inserting his head.

4

(Id.

at 33-34) . The officer

In addition, the officer stated that he had difficulty
hearing Burton, and so placed his head near the window.
(Transcript at 21). Listening to Burton's statements is part of
the investigation.
9

obtained no additional evidence because of his alleged "search."
Burton relies heavily on the fact that the officer could not
remember asking if Burton had been drinking.
12) .

The

transcript

videotape does. 5

does not

reveal

the

(Burton's Brief at

explanation,

but

the

The officer did not need to ask if Burton had

been drinking, because Burton volunteered the information himself.
Burton's

statement, which came prior

to and

independent

alleged "search," also justified further investigation,

of

any

including

field sobriety tests.
Burton

mistakenly

cites State

v.

Schlosser,

774

P. 2d

1132

(Utah 1989), to support his contention that any warrantless search
of a vehicle is illegal.

However, Schlosser clearly states that a

warrantless search of a vehicle is justified "if there is probable
cause for the search
also

. . . ."

Schlosser,

774 P. 2d at 1135; see

United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982).

Burton's

argument,

Schlosser

does

not

prohibit

all

Contrary to
warrantless

vehicle searches, it requires probable cause before a vehicle may
be searched.
In this case, the officer had probable cause that Burton was
drunk.

In order

to quickly

and

this,

the

officer merely placed his head closer to Burton and sniffed

the

5

efficiently

confirm

Burton insists that this Court "ignore . . . the references
. . ." to the admissions made on the videotape.
(Burton's Brief at
13 n. 9 ) . However, the videotape was introduced as evidence, and
is thus part of the record. (Transcript at 17-18).
Furthermore,
the officer testified that Burton volunteered that he had been
drinking.
{Id.
at 1 5 ) .
Since Burton's admission is clearly
established in the record, the Court is obligated to consider it.
10

air.

This quickly confirmed the extent of Burton's intoxication.

The search was justified under Lopez

Schlosser.6

and

To conclude, the trial judge's ruling to suppress the field
sobriety tests was not supported by the evidence.
detected

The officer

the odor of alcohol prior to inserting his head and

allegedly "searching" Burton's vehicle.

(Transcript at 33-34).
{Id.

Furthermore, Burton admitted that he was drunk.
Videotape).

at 15,

The officer had probable cause before any alleged

"search," and was

justified

in conducting

quickly confirm that Burton was drunk.

an

investigation

to

Sniffing the air near

Burton quickly confirmed that Burton was very intoxicated and posed
a threat to other drivers.

No new evidence was obtained from the

alleged "search," and Burton was not inconvenienced.
officer's action was appropriate under Lopez.

Thus, the

Finally, Burton

completely misapplies Schlosser.

The officer had probable cause,

so

to

the

"search," being

limited

confirmation

of

alcohol

on

Burton's breath, was appropriate and justified.
III. EVEN IF THE SEARCH IS IMPROPER, THE FIELD SOBRIETY
TESTS ARE ADMISSIBLE,
BECAUSE
THERE
IS AN
INDEPENDENT SOURCE FOR THAT EVIDENCE.
Even if the alleged "search" was improper, the field sobriety
tests are still admissible, because there is an independent source
for them.

As stated in Appellant's Brief, "evidence which would be

6

As is argued below, the "search" yielded no new evidence.
The officer had already detected the odor of alcohol from outside
the vehicle prior to the "search."
11

subject to the exclusionary rule may be admissible if the police
had

an

source'

for

(Appellant's Brief at 10; see

also

1288,

'independent

1293

admissible

(Utah App.
despite

the

discovery

of

the

evidence."

State v. Northrup, 756 P. 2d

1988) .

The

field

alleged

"improper

sobriety

tests

are

search," because

the

officer had developed a reasonable articulable suspicion prior to
the alleged "search."
As has been discussed, the judge specifically held that the
officer detected the odor of alcohol prior to inserting his head
into

the vehicle.

(Transcript

at

32-34) .

In addition,

the

videotape shows, and the officer's testimony confirms that Burton
admitted he was drunk.

{Id.

at 15, Videotape).

All of this

evidence was obtained prior to the alleged "search."

This evidence,

as has been stated, gave the officer probable cause to conduct the
field sobriety tests.
To conclude, even if the "search" is removed from the picture
altogether, the officer still had ample evidence to require Burton
to

perform

improper.

field

sobriety

tests, and

the

judge's

ruling

was

Suppression of evidence should not put the government in

a worse position if the police would have obtained the evidence if
no misconduct had taken place.

The facts show that field sobriety

tests were justified, even if the "search" was improper.
IV.

THE FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS ARE ADMISSIBLE
BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT OBTAINED AS A RESULT OF
THE "SEARCH."

Even if the "search" is improper, the field sobriety tests are

12

admissible because they were not obtained as a result
"search."

of the

The exclusionary rule only suppresses "evidence obtained

by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution."
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); see also

Mapp

State v. Shoulderblade,

905 P.2d 289, 292 (Utah 1995). Thus, if the "search" was improper,
only the evidence that was obtained as a result of that search
should be excluded.
No evidence should be excluded, because no new evidence was
obtained that led to the field sobriety tests.

The alleged "search"

only confirmed that Burton had the odor of alcohol on his breath,
which

the officer had already detected prior to the "search."

(Transcript
improper,

at

32-34).

Therefore,

even

if

the

it had no effect on the admissibility

"search" was
of the field

sobriety tests, because no new evidence was obtained that led to
those tests.
Appellant weakly contends that the record does not support the
"independent source" for the field sobriety tests.7

However, the

judge's rulings and the videotape establish that the officer had
probable cause to request the field sobriety tests despite any
"search."

Since the "search" yielded no evidence, and since the

field sobriety tests are admissible even if the "search" had never

7

Burton also argues that the sobriety tests are not
"attenuated" from the alleged "search." "It is apparent from the
record that the odor . . . stemmed from the illegal search . . . ."
(Burton's Brief at 20 and 20). This is wrong. What is apparent
from the record is that the officer detected the odor of alcohol
prior to any alleged "search," (Transcript at 32-34), and that
Burton voluntarily admitted he was drunk. {Id. at 15, Videotape.)
13

occurred, the trial judge's ruling must be reversed, and the field
sobriety tests must be admitted.

CONCLUSION
Suppression of evidence should not place the government in a
worse position if the evidence would have been obtained in the
absence

of any improper conduct.

argument.

That summarizes

Appellant's

Even if the "search" was improper, the record shows that

the field sobriety tests were justified without the "search."

In

the alternative, appellant argues that the "search" was not an
improper intrusion, but was justified under State

v.

Lopez.

Either

way, the trial judge's ruling was wrong, and it should be reversed.
The

record

of

the

hearing

available for this Court's review.

to

suppress

is

complete

and

The transcript contains all of

the proceedings, all documents are available for review, and the
videotape

of

Burton's

arrest

for drunken

driving,

(which was

introduced as evidence at the hearing) is also available for the
Court.

Burton now expects a ruling in his favor because the trial

judge failed to make findings of fact and conclusions of law.
However, the record is complete enough to review.

Even if those

findings were deemed necessary, the proper remedy is remand to
obtain them.

Appellant has no objection to remand, because it

agrees that findings of fact based on the proceedings of the trial
court would be beneficial.
The alleged "search" was actually part of the officer's proper
investigation of a potential crime.
14

Despite Burton's contention to

the contrary, the trial judge held that the officer detected the
odor of alcohol prior to any alleged search.

Furthermore, the

videotape and the officer's testimony reveal that Burton admitted
he was drunk.
officer
committed

a

As the trial judge held, this information gave the

reasonable
a

crime,

articulable

and

thus

suspicion

the

expanded. (Transcript at 32-34; see

scope
also

of

that
his

Burton

had

investigation

State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d

1127 (Utah 1994)).
The permissible scope of the officer's investigation allowed
him

to diligently pursue a means of

investigation

that would

quickly confirm or dispel the suspicion of criminal activity.

The

officer testified that he confirmed not the presence of alcohol on
Burton's breath, but the extent of his intoxication.

(As has been

stated, the officer detected the odor of alcohol prior to the
alleged "search.") The officer confirmed the degree of Burton's
impairment by placing his head closer to Burton, so he could sniff
the air.

This quickly and efficiently confirmed the extent of

Burton's intoxication only, as the odor of alcohol had already been
detected.
hearing

In addition, the officer testified that he had trouble
Burton,

so

communicate better.
part

of

he

his

head

closer

in

order

to

Listening to the statements of a defendant is

an officer's

inconvenienced

placed

investigation.

Finally,

Burton was not

by the alleged "search," because

it quickly and

efficiently confirmed the extent of his intoxication.

Which is

more rapid and convenient: Sniffing the air briefly or performing
field sobriety tests?

The officer's actions were thus acceptable
15

and justified, and the trial judge should be reversed.
In the alternative, even if the "search" was improper, the
field sobriety tests are admissible based on the evidence obtained
independent of the "search."

Independently-obtained evidence is

admissible despite improper conduct.
1288 (Utah App. 1988).

State v. Northrup, 756 P.2d

The trial court specifically held that the

officer detected the odor of alcohol prior to any alleged "search."
This gave

the officer a reasonable articulable

suspicion that

Burton was drunk, and justified field sobriety tests.

Furthermore,

the record and the videotape show that Burton voluntarily admitted
he was drunk, which also justified the field sobriety tests.

Even

if the alleged improper conduct had never taken place, the field
sobriety tests would be admissible.
In a related vein, the "search" produced no new evidence, and
did not result in the field sobriety tests.

The exclusionary rule

only requires the suppression of evidence obtained as a result of
improper conduct. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); State v.
Shoulderblade, 905 P.2d 289, 292 (Utah 1995).

The facts of this

case show that the alleged "search" did not yield any evidence
leading, to the field sobriety tests.

The officer detected the odor

of alcohol prior to the alleged "search," and Burton voluntarily
admitted he was drunk.

At most, the "search" merely confirmed the

extent of Burton's intoxication, but did not yield new evidence
that

led to the field sobriety tests.

obtained, none can be suppressed.
therefore be reversed.
16

Since no evidence was

The trial judge's ruling must

To conclude, the trial judge's decision to suppress the field
sobriety

tests was wrong.

The tests are admissible based on

evidence obtained independently of any impropriety.

The alleged

"search" was proper under as a reasonable investigation of criminal
activity, based on the officer's reasonable articulable suspicion
obtained prior to any "search."

Either way, the field sobriety

tests are admissible, and the trial judge's decision to suppress
them must be reversed.
For these reasons, Appellant respectfully requests that this
Court reverse the order of the Third Circuit Court suppressing
evidence in this case.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 16th day of January, 1997.

ELLIOT R/LAWRENCE
Assistant City Attorney
Attorney for Appellant
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